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THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT
AND THE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER TO THE PRESIDENT*
FORREST REVERB BLACKt
Theodore Roosevelt, the great exponent of the strenuous life, who
had the personal misfortune to reign during a period of profound
peace, insisted constantly on the expansion of national executive
power. Primarily a man of action, he was interested more in results
than in methods. On September 28, 19o6, energetically carrying out
his "Big Stick" policy, he telegraphed Secretary of War Taft con-
cerning an adjustment of Cuban affairs as follows: "I do not care in
the least for the fact that such an agreement is unconstitutional."'
Today, Franklin D. Roosevelt, confronted with a critical emergency,
and patriotically convinced that strenuous executive leadership and
executive action are imperative, has, in effect, accepted the Theodore
Roosevelt philosophy of government.
In our opinion, the present Executive, if successful, will go down in
history as the master pragmatist. We suspect that his strategy, as
divulged to the "Brain Trust," might be formulated as follolws: "If
the 'New Deal' works, it will be a fait accompli before the Supreme
Court has an opportunity to pass on its constitutionality;2 and if it
* This paper was read before the Round Table on Public Law at the meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools at Chicago, December 29, 1933.
tProfessor of Law, University of Kentucky.
'Quoted in PIERCE, FEDERAL USURPATION (1908) p. 154.
2Under our system, a court can never keep up with a legislature and skillful
draftsmen and an alert administration can always keep a year or two ahead of
judical review. Further the court can usually avoid embarassing decisions on
constitutionality by the following devices: (I) refuse jurisdiction on the ground
that there was no case or controversy presented (Finklestein, Judical Self
Limitation (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 338); (2) or that the question is "political"
innature; Lutherv. Borden, 7 How. (U. S.) i (1849); Georgiav. Stanton, 6Wall.
(U. S.) So (z867); Pacific States Telephone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118, 32 Sup.
Ct. 224 (1912); (3) or existing codes and licensing agreements might be enforced
on the theory of "consent", estopping the objector from asserting invalidity, the
agreements being not contrary to public policy (See note in (1933) 28 Ill. L. REv.
544,546); (4) an injured competitor might seek an injunction against the violator
of a code of fair competition to restrain its violation, and the court could evade
the constitutional question by holding either (a) that the damage shown was too
remote or (b) that the petitioner should first exhaust his administrative remedy
(See White v. Federal Radio Comm., 29 F. (2d) i I3 (N. D. Ill. 1928)). Finally, the
court has wide discretion as to its docket.
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fails, we'll try to stand up under the additional condemnation of
'half a dozen elderly gentlemen smugly dozing in arm chairs.' "a
If the New Deal is upheld, novel and revolutionary interpretations
must be given to the commerce and the due process clauses and to
the doctrine of private business affected with a public interest.
Many constitutional lawyers of the old school insist that the most
vulnerable point in the Roosevelt legislative program hinges on the
delegation of legislative power to the President. We do not share this
belief. Referring to this phase of the problem, President Roosevelt
in a radio address said: "Our policies are wholly within purposes for
which our American Constitution was established 1 50 years ago.
There was no actual surrender of power. Congress still retains its
constitutional authority and no one has the slightest desire to change
the balance of these powers. The function of Congress is to decide
what has to be done and to select the appropriate agency to carry
out its will. The only thing that has been happening has been to
designate the President as the agency to carry out certain of the pur-
poses of Congress. This was c6nstitutional an in keeping with past
American tradition." '4
The doctrine that Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the
President is a corollary of the doctrine of the separation of powers.
At the one extreme, we find the legal conceptualists, who laud the
separation of powers doctrine as a fetich and regard delegation as a
breach of a sacred trust and contrary to the genius of our institutions5
and this in spite of the fact that there is no express distributing clause
and no mention of the doctrine of delegata Potestas mn potest delegari
in the Constitution of the United States. At the other extreme are
those who assert that the tripartite division is the great American
illusion,6 that it is a fiction of law and of political science, void of
significance or value, necessarily disregarded in fact, and incapable
of consistent application except by pretense.7 We submit that the
3ADAMS, BROOKS, THE THEORY OF SocIAL REVOLUTIONS (1913) pp. 214, 215.
4Radio address, Sunday, May 7, 1933.
5Strange to relate, Justice Story approves the delegation doctrine in an ex-
tremely limited sense. He says, "When we speak of a separation of the three great
departments of government and maintain that separation is indispensable to
public liberty we are to understand this maxim in a limited sense. The true mean-
ing is that the whole power of one of these departments should not be exercised
by the same hands which possess the whole power of either of the other depart-
ments." I CONSTITUTION (5th. ed., 1891) 393.
Book Review (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 936,938.7This statement is challenged by Professor Green, in Separation of Govern-
mental Power (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 369, 370. See LASKI, AUTHORITY IN THE
MODERN STATE (1919) pp. 70, 71; GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW (1903) P. 20.
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truth lies somewhere between these extremes. The tripartite system
of separation of powers in our government, as evidenced by Articles
I, II and III of our Constitution, is the result of a combination of
historical experience and a political theory generally accepted in this
country in the latter part of the eighteenth century.8 Montesquieu,
who had much to do with the development of the theory, based it on
a misconception of the English Constitution of his day.9
Let us start our analysis with the statement by Chief Justice
Marshall that "The difference between the departments undoubtedly
is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary
construes the law; but the makers of the law may commit something
to the discretion of the other departments and the precise boundary
of this power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which
a court will not enter unnecessarily."' 0 The second part of Marshall's
statement has become significant, in view of the growth and com-
plexity of modern political, economic and social institutions. Congress
has been compelled by a sort of manifest destiny to delegate more and
greater powers to the President. And with the coming of this un-
precedented depression, Congress has transferred unusual and tre-
mendous discretionary powers to the Chief Executive. Hardly any
power that can be exercised by a soverign, short of declaring war,
goes further than the power to change the value of the currency"1 or,
under certain conditions, to put an industry under a system of licens-
ing, and to revoke the license, after notice and hearing, at his dis-
cretion.'2 General Hugh Johnson has gained the reputation for
exaggerated statement, but when he characterizes this power as the
power of "economic life and death," he is verily speaking the stark
and naked truth.
The question arises, are there any limitations on this power of
delegation? Must we resign ourselves to the constitutional possi-
bility of a further unlimited expiansion of bureaucratic government,13
SFairlie, Separation of Powers (1922) 21 MICH. L. REv. 393.
9Ehrlich, Montesguieu and Sociological Jurisprudence (1916) 29 HARv. L. REv.
582, 592.
10Wayman v. Southard, io Wheat. (U. S.) I, 46 (1825).
"TITLE III, SEC. 43. of the AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT (THoMAs
AMENDMENT), approved May 12, 1933.
1 SEc. 4 (b) of the N. I. R. A., approved June I6, 1933.
23England, without a written constitution and in the absence of "judical
review" is confronted with the problem of a growing bureaucracy. Lord Chief
Justice Hewart has pointed out in an eloquent manner the dangers implicit in the
"new despotism". The paradox which is in course of being accomplished in
England is indeed rather elaborate. Writers on the English Constitution have for
a long time taught that its two leading features are the Sovereignty of Parliament
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dictated in the immediate future by a virile party leader, who con-
tinues to hold the patronage power over a subservient Congress?1 4
It is true that theoretically this is emergency legislation containing
a time limit and that theoretically Congress can take back these
powers, but on the contrary it should not be overlooked that the
bolder spirits in the administration sometimes advocate measures
which, after their adoption, lead necessarily to further measures.
One sometimes wonders whether there is art in this. Some of the
Roosevelt advisors believe in a "totalitarian state" and the legisla-
tion thus far enacted is but the first step in an "orderly revolution."
That step having been taken, will Congress retrace its steps? Secre-
tary Ickes has said, "The Government has to go a new way because
the old way is closed forever."' 5
We shall now attempt to analyze, in summary fashion, the leading
cases developing the doctrine of the delegation of legislative power to
the President. At the outset, the significent fact should be noted that
there is not a single case decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States in which a delegation of legislative power by Congress to the
President has been held invalid on that ground.16 For convenience,
and the Rule of Law. To tamper with either of them was, it might be thought, a
sufficiently serious undertaking. But how far more attractive to the ingenuous
and adventurous mind to employ the one to defeat the other, and to establish a
despotism on the ruins of both. It is manifestly easy to point a superficial con-
trast between what was done or attempted in the days of our least wise kings,
and what is being done or attempted today. In those days the method was to
defy Parliament, and it failed. In these days the method is to cajole, to coerce
and to use Parliament, and it is strangely successful. The old despotism, which
was defeated, offered Parliament a challenge. The new despotism, which is not
yet defeated, gives Parliament an anaesthetic. The strategy is different, but the
goal is the same. It is to subordinate Parliament, to evade the courts and to render
the will, or the caprice of the Executive, unfettered and supreme," HEWART,
THE NEW DESPOTISM (1929) p. 17.
4Mark Sullivan, in a syndicated article, December 2, 1933, takes exception to
the statement of former Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, who, in commenting
on our situation, said, "I do not believe there is any man who is good enough and
knows enough to exercise dictatorial power over a free people." Mr. Sullivan
counters by insisting that "we are still a free people," that Roosevelt is not a
dictator, but that we are witnessing the spectacle of a "highly personal govern-
ment" in operation, within constitutional limits.1 SOcIAL CONTROL OF THE SouRcEs OF LIviNG (1933), pamphlet, p. 7.
John Dickinson has said, "If the diagnosis on which the N. I. R. A. rests isvalid,
and if the remedies which it seeks to apply are sound, it is addressed not merely
to the emergency but to certain continuing and long-run problems which the
emergency serves to bring out and set in sharp relief." (1933), 33 COL. L. Rnv.,
pp. lO95-1o96.
6Duff and Whiteside, Ddegata Protestas Non Potest Delegari, A Maxim of
American Constitutional Law (1924) 14 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY x68; (1923)
23 COL. L. REv. 66; (1933) 47 HARV. L. REv. 85, 95.
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the cases to date can be classified into three groups.17 (i) Congress
promulgates the basic policy and provides that the enforcement of
the statute is to depend on an act or finding by the President. In
Aurora v. United States,18 Congress delegated to the President the
power to determine whether Great Britain and France had revoked
their edicts discriminating against us, upon the proclamation of which,
an act of Congress which had previously expired, was to be revived.
Here is a fact or contingency to be determined by the President that
is rather definite. In Field v. Clark,19 the fact was more difficult to
determine; whether foreign countries were imposing duties on Ameri-
can goods that were "unequal and unreasonable". (2) Congress
furnishes the "general provisions" and the basic policy and demar-
cates the limits of the policy delegated as fully as the circumstances
permit.2 0 In United States v. Grimaud,2' the Secretary of Agriculture
was authorized to make rules and regulations governing the occupancy
and use of forest reservations, the general policy of the law and the
penalties being declared by Congress. In Buttfield v. Stranahan, 2
the Secretary of the Treasury was to determine what is an "un-
reasonable obstruction" of interstate commerce. (3) In construing
the Flexible Tariff Act,2 the Supreme Court of the United States
introduced a new emphasis in the case of Hampton v. United States, 24
which makes for a still more liberal policy with reference to the dele-
gation of legislative power to the President. The Tariff Act of 1922
provided that the President should have power to increase or decrease
a tariff rate fixed by Congress, not exceeding 50 per cent if, on in-
vestigation, he consideredit necessary in order to equalize the cost of
production in the United States and the principal competing country.
Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the Court, held that this Act set up
an "intelligible principle"," i. e., equalization to which the President
was to conform. The appellant's argument in a sense began at this
point. While conceding an apparent standard, the appellant contended
that the production factors are so varied and so indefinite that the
fact can never be found. Hence, as the standard is incapable of
definite ascertainment, the President, in making his decision, is, in
effect, setting the standard himself. It is true that the President had
the facilities of the Tariff Commission at his disposal and that a
17An excellent analysis is made in a note in (1933) 31 MIcH. L. REv. 786.,
187 Cr. (U. S.) 382 (1813). 19143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495 (1891).
2'(1933) 47 HARv. L. REv. 85, 94. 21220 U. S. 56, 31 Sup. Ct. 480 (1910).
22192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. 349 (1903).
2142 STAT. 858, 941 (1922), 19 U. S. C. §§121, 153-4 (1926), U. S. CoMP. STAT.
(SuPP. 1923) §58410-I9 et seg. 2276 U. S. 394, 48 Sup. Ct..348 (1928).
"276 U. S. 394, at 409, 48 Sup. Ct. 348 (1928).
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hearing was provided,8 but on the other hand, experts on tariff
making have testified as follows: Professor TaussigZ7 has said, "Even
the most competent and impartial Tariff Commissioner will often
have to confess that there is no one figure which can be unqualifiedly
said to be the accurate one." Thomas Walker Page2 8 has said, "The
conclusion cannot be escaped that it is rarely possible to ascertain
accurately the difference in costs of production at home and abroad."
But the court, in addition to holding that the act did establish an
"intelligible principle" went further and shifted the emphasis from
the inquiry whether there was a delegation to the problem of the
necessity of the delegation. The court said,2 9 "In determining what
Congress may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the
extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to
the common sense and inherent necessities of the governmental co-
ordination." When we bear in mind that the inflexibility of tariff acts
in the past has often served to defeat protection 0 and that this fact
is responsible for the introduction into our legislation of the flexible
tariff principle, it requires no great stretch of the imagination to
realize that if the Taft "necessity doctrine" is pushed to its logical
conclusion it would be possible constitutionally for Congress to pass
a general tariff law declaring that the duty on all imported goods
should equal the difference between the costs of production here and
abroad and delegate to the Presideni the power to ascertain and
proclaim the facts, and thereby remove the detailed making of
tariff laws from the halls of Congress.31
But there is a later case under the Flexible Tariff Act which goes
even further-Fox River Butter Company v. United States.32 The con-
troversy in this case involved paragraph 710 of the Act, which
reads "cheese and substitutes therefor, 5 cents per pound, but not
less than 25% ad valorem." Acting under Section 315, the President
in his proclamation of 1927 provided, "cheese by whatever name
known, having the eye formation characteristic of the Swiss or
Emmenthayler type, seven and one-half cents per pound, but not
less than thirty-seven and a half % ad valorem." The Court of Cus-
2'It should also be noted that the President has a broad discretion as to whether
he will initiate the process. 3TCONG. RECORD, Jan. 4, 1926, at p. io5r.
28MAKING THE TARIFF OF THE UNITED STATES (1924) p. 99.
29Supra note 25.
30Walter F. Welch, The Flexible Provisions of the Tariff Act (1926) 31 VA. L.
REv. 2o6. 31Idem, at p. 226.
-T. D. 44667 (Customs Court, 3rd. Div.). Held, invalid. Reversed in 20 C. C.
P. A. (bust.) 38, certiorari denied by United States Supreme Court in 287 U. S.
628, 53 Sup. Ct. 83 (1932).
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toms held that this was an invalid delegation of legislative power
because the President was in fact reclassifying and re-writing the Act.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed this finding and
the Supreme Court of the United States denied a writ of certiorari.**
The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals said, "The
statute contemplated a legal investigation by the Tariff Commission
as a condition precedent to the issuance of a lawful proclamation by
the President, but the findings contemplated by ,the statute were to
be made by the President, not by the Tariff Commission. The in-
vestigationwas to 'assist the President'." But the courtheld that it
was immaterial what opinions were entertained by the investigators,
or the members of the Tariff Commission, as a result of such investi-
gation. The statute, as construed, provides for a queer form of
"assistance" to the President.34
From this review of the cases,35 it should be noted that the Supreme
uThis denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States is sig-
nificant because it appears that the Fox River Butter case is more extreme than
the Hampton case. The statute creating the Court of Customs Appeal (Act of
Aug. 5, 19o9, c. 6 U. S. Stats. at Large, v. 36, p. ioo) was amended on Aug. 22,
1914 (c. 267 U. S. Stats. at Large, v. 38, p. 708) so that it was made possible for
the Supreme Court, in its discretion, to call up by certiorari decisions which it
regards of "sufficient importance to review." (See DICKINsoN, ADMINISTRATIVE
JUsTIcE AND THE SUPREMACY oF LAW (1927) p. 276).
A writer in (1932) 20 CALIF. L. REV. 330, believes that the Fox River case is an
illustration of declaring the "event" on the happening of the "contingency" ...
If upon investigation of "cheese and substitutes therefor" he finds one particular
grade out of adjustment, whereas the rest of the class is properly adjusted, is it
not "common sense" that the President should single out this particular grade
rather than allow the inequality, or cause a greater inequality by adjusting the
whole field?
3It would seem that the Act of 1930 [46 STAT. 701, §336, sub. c., 19 U. S. C., p.
172, §1336, sub. c., CUMULATIVE PACKET, (1933)] reduces the discretion of the
President to merely affirming or refusing to affirm the findings of the Tariff
Commission, and puts in the latter body the actual determination of changes,
where it could more easily be controlled by the courts.
uSome of the state courts have formulated a different test. Dowlingv. Lanca-
shire Insurance Company, 92 Wis. 63, 65 N. W. 738 (x896) sets up the mechanical
standard that the law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions when it
leaves the legislative branch. This is contra to the U. S. v. Grimaud doctrine.
See also Arms v. Ayers, 192 III. 6o, 61 N. E. 851 (19o) for similar view. Another
method by which the courts give lip service to the doctrine is to strictly qualify
"legislative" i. e., it must be "strictly and essentially" or "strictly and exclusively"
legislative, see Lumpkin, J. in Southern Railroad v. Melton, 133 Ga. 227, 65 S. E.
665 (1909), or "purely legislative duties" in State v. Crosby, 92 Minn. 176, 99
N. W. 636 (19o4). A few state courts have held that if the standard is too vague
and indefinite, the law is invalid, i. e., a California statute was held invalid on the
ground that the standard was too indefinite, which enforced through the State
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Court l considers at least three principles: (i) the defiiteness of the
standard laid down by the statute for the guidance of the President;
(2) the degree of necessity, in view of the subject matter, for the
delegation; and perhaps (3) as a practical element, the confidence
felt by the court in the body so entrusted with the power.
In conclusion, let us consider the basic policies30 7 laid down by
Congress in the National Industrial Recovery Act. 8 They are ten in
number: (I) to remove obstructions to commerce, (2) to promote
cooperative action among trade groups, (3) to eliminate unfair com-
petitive practices, (4) to utilize more fully the productive capacity
of industry, (5) to avoid undue restriction of production (except as
may be temporarily required), (6) to increase the purchasing power of
consumers, (7) to reduce unemployment, (8) to improve standards of
labor, and (9) to rehabilitate industry and (io) to conserve natural
resources. In view of the precedents," we conclude that the N. I.
Director of Agriculture a law which provided that "oranges shall be considered
unfit for shipment when frosted to the extent of endangering the reputation of the
citrus industry." Ex Parte Peppers, 389 Cal. 682, 209 Pac. 896 (1932). The
Supreme Court of Illinois, by a 4 to 3 decision, held invalid a law that conferred
on the fire marshal power to order "any building to be removed or remedied
which for want of proper repair, or by reason of age and dilapidated condition,
or for any cause, is especially liable to fire," People ex rel Camber v. Sholem,
294 Ill. 204, 128 N. E. 377 (1920).
,"See (1928) 4 HARv. L. Rv. 95, Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476,
34 Sup. Ct. 986 (3913).
37Professor McLaughlin has said that "the act not only announces no rules of
law, but it sets up no standard to guide the employees who are to make the law,
except the vaguest references to general welfare... Of less importance, it endeavors
to outline no organization or machinery. In general, it discloses a dearth of ideas
concerning the policy to be pursued by the United States." CASES ON THE FEDERAL
ANTI-TRusT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1933) P. 719.38Title I, §I-B. See also OUTLINE OF THE NEw DEAL LEGISLATION (1933), by
PROFESSOR HOWARD S. PIQUET, p. 7.
3
'In the case of N. Y. Central Securities Co. v. U. S., 287 U. S. 32, 53 Sup. Ct.
45 (1932), the court held that there was no unconstitutional delegation of power
by reason of uncertainty in the stated criteria in section 5, sub-division 2 of the
I. C. C. Act empowering the Commission to authorize the acquisition of control
of one carrier by another if of the opinion that such acquisition of control
will be "in the public interest." The term is not synonymous with general welfare,
but has direct relation to the adequacy of transportation service, to its essential
conditions of economy and efficiency, and to appropriate provision and best use
of transportation facilities... (Comment in (i933) I GEORGE WASH. L. REv. n34).
In Mutual Film Co. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230, 245, 35
Sup. Ct. 387 (3914) the commission was given power to determine whether a
given film was "moral or educational or amusing or harmless." In Sears Roebuck
v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 Fed. 307-312 C. C. A. the Federal Trade Com-
missionwasto determinewhatwas "unfair competition." The court said the words
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R. A., which authorizes the President to prescribe codes of fair com-
petition, issue and revoke licenses, fix hours of labor, rates of pay and
such other conditions as he may find necessary to effectuate the
policy of the Act is not unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative
power. Our highest court has taken an extremely liberal view with
reference to the definiteness and clarity of the legislative standard.40
In the last analysis, the doctrine of delegata potestas non potest delegari
is deduced from the nature of our institutions. When there is a rev-
olutionary change in economic and social structure, it is inevitable
that this will be reflected in our political institutions, and-no court,
unless bound by a square holding, will refuse to recognize this
phenomenon. It is our prediction that if the judical axe is applied
to the "New Deal" it will be because Congress has attempted to
legislate with reference to a subject matter that is outside the scope
of its constitutional powers, and if delegation to the President happens
"Unfair methods of competition" stand on the same footing with such terms as
unsound mind, undue influence, unfaithfulness, unfit for cultivation, unreasonable
rate and unjust discrimination. In Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 44 Sup. Ct. 283
(1924), the court upheld a statute empowering Secretary of Labor to deport
aliens who had been convicted under war-time statutes "if after hearing he should
find such aliens are undesirable residents of the United States." The court declared
that in its opinion "our history has created a common understanding of the words
'undesirable residents' which gives them the quality of a recognized standard."
In an article entitled Administrative Discretion (1933) 2 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. at
pp. 6-7, Mr. Henry Wolfe Bikle, General Counsel of the Pennsylvania Railroad
has said, "I have sometimes asked ex-Commissioners of the I. C. C. how they
decided that rates were 'unreasonable' or that things were 'in the public interest'.
I have never got a very satisfactory answer. They seemed just to do it. And I
never had the temerity to ask a sitting Commissioner because of a little verse that
was called to my attention some time ago."
"The centipede was happy quite
Until a frog in fun
Said; 'pray, Which foot comes after which
When you begin to run?'
Which wrought her mind to such a pitch
She lay distracted in a ditch,
Considering how to run."
40
"Specificity is a characteristic of primitive law, but in a complex social system,
specificity must be supplanted by general rules embracing large classes of facts,
to be applied in accordance with some more general standard." Pound, Juristic
Science and Law (x918), 31 HARv. L. REv. IO47, io6o. The delegation issue raised
by the Recovery Act challenges our legal thinking to disclose whether it is or-
ganic and living, or merely mechanical, verbal and restrictive." John Dickinson
in (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. IO95, iioo.
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to be involved in such a case, that will be only an incidental
consideration.4 '
4lSections of the N. I. R. A. which might conceivably involve the delegation of
legislative power to the President:
(x) See. 2 (a) The President is hereby authorized to establish such agencies to
accept and utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services, to appoint with-
out regard to the provisions of the civil service laws, such officers and employees,
and to utilize such Federal officials and employees.., as he may find necessary,
to prescribe their authorities, duties, responsibilities and tenure, and without
regard to the Classification Act, fix the compensation of any officers and employees
so appointed.
(2)'Sec. 3 (a) Upon the application of the President by one or more trade or in-
dustrial associations or groups, the President may approve a code or codes of fair
competition for the trade or industry... if the President finds (i) that such
associations... impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to membership
... and are truly representative of such trades and (2) that such codes are not
designed to promote monopolies.., or to oppress small enterprises. The President
may, as a condition of his approval of any such code, impose conditions... for the
protection of consumers, competitors, employees and others, and in furtherance
of the public interest, and may prescribe such exceptions to such code as the
President in his discretion deems necessary to effectuate the policy herein declared.
(3) Sec. 3 (d) Upon his own motion, or if complaint is made, and if no code of
fair competition thereforhas been approved by the President, the President after
notice and hearing as he shall specify, may prescribe and approve a code of fair
competition for such trade, which shall have the same effect as a code of fair
competition approved by the President under subsection (a) of this section.
(4) See. 4 (b) Whenever the President shall find that destructive wage or price
cutting or other activities contrary to the policies of the Act are being practiced
in any trade or industry, and after such public notice and hearing as he shall
specify, shall find it essential to license business enterprises in order to make
effective a code of fair competition.., and shall publicly announce, no person
shall after a date fixed in such announcement engage in or carry on business, in
or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, unless he shall first have obtained a
license . . . The President may suspend or revoke any such license, after due
notice and opportunity for hearing ... Any order of the President suspending or
revoking such license shall be final if in accordance with law... This subsection
shall cease to be in effect at the expiration of one year after the passage of the Act.
(5) Sec. 7 (b) The President shall so far as practicable afford opportunity for
mutual agreement of employers and employees as to maximum hours of labor,
minimum rates of pay, and such other conditions of employment as may be
necessary to effectuate the policy of this act, and the standards established by such
agreements, when approved by the President under subsection (a) of section 3.(6) Sec. 7 (c) Where no such mutual agreement has been approved, he may in-
vestigate conditions ... and after such hearings as he deems advisable, lie is
authorized to prescribe a limited code of fair competition fixing such maximum
hours, minimum pay, and other conditions of employment as he finds to be neces-
sary to effectuate the policy of the act, which shall have the same effect as a code
of fair competition approved by the President under subsection (a) of Section 3
... There is a limitation on the President from setting a maximum wage.
